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1. Eurostat conducted a
survey and provides data
on the breakdown of gov-
ernment debt by country
but has three shortcom-
ings: first they only start in
2002 ending in 2010;
second, they are only
annual; third, they do not
disaggregate within finan-
cial corporations (meaning
that domestic banks are
reported together with all
the other financial institu-
tions and the central
banks). IMF (2011a) also
looks at holdings of govern-
ment debt but with a
broader breakdown. BIS
data published in January
looks at cross border claims
of foreign banks on each
country's public sector.
Data is not entirely compa-
rable with our non-resident
holdings because the meas-
ure is not the same and
because: (i) BIS banks
would only be a subset of
our non residents; (ii) we do
not have information on the
breakdown of non-resident
holdings, so we only
observe the ‘net’ result.
THE CRISIS HAS REVEALED A CRITICAL WEAKNESS
of euro-area countries: the strong
interdependence between banking and sovereign
crisis. This is not a specific feature of the euro area
– it has been documented that, historically,
banking crises tend to be followed by sovereign
crises – but for the euro area the vicious cycle
seems to be particularly strong.
The reason why euro-area banks and sovereign
seem to be indissolubly tied together is twofold.
First, given the absence of a supranational bank-
ing resolution framework, member states remain
individually responsible for the rescue of their
national banking systems. Given the size of the
banking systems across the euro area, this
implies that the fiscal consequences of bank res-
cues are potentially large, and explains how stress
in the banking system can spill over to the sover-
eigns. Second, domestic banks hold on their bal-
ance sheets a considerable share of national
government debt. Any doubt about sovereign
solvency immediately affects domestic banks.
This bank-sovereign interdependence constitutes
one of the features of the euro area that renders it
especially fragile (Pisani-Ferry, 2012).
Our analysis intends to shed some light on the
second channel of the sovereign/banks vicious
cycle. By using data on the breakdown of
government debt by holding sectors, we show that
domestic banks in key continental euro-area
countries have traditionally accounted for a larger
share of government debt than in the United
Kingdom or the United States (where, instead, the
national central banks started very early on to
play an important role). The introduction of the
euro has to some extent reduced this
phenomenon, by fostering portfolio diversification
and resulting in a significant increase in cross-
border sovereign-bond holdings. As a
consequence, the share of domestic banks has
been eroded by non-resident holders in all
countries across the euro area. By 2007, however,
just before the outbreak of the financial crisis, the
share of government debt held by domestic banks
was still very large, particularly for the countries
that have been subject to the greatest pressure
on the sovereign-bond markets (Greece, Ireland,
Italy, Portugal and Spain). More worryingly, these
holdings – and the associated vulnerabilities –
have increased substantially during the crisis in
the peripheral countries, where domestic banks
have played a key role in compensating for the
outflow of scared foreign investors.
The important role of banks in holding debt issued
by ‘their’ sovereigns has become a vulnerability
during the crisis, when the solvency of sovereigns
has started to be questioned and the stress on the
sovereign-bond markets has translated into pres-
sure on the banking system. These considerations
suggest that reducing the share of of government
debt held by national banks could help to reduce
sovereign vulnerability in the euro area. But it
raises in turn the question of who would finance
sovereigns in place of domestic banks, in 2012
and after.
THE DATA
To understand what role domestic banks have
played in holding sovereign debt, a breakdown of
marketable government debt by holding sectors
is required. Unfortunately this data is not available
from a single official source at euro-area level, so
we have assembled data provided by national
sources (national central banks, statistical
authorities, treasuries)1. The sample comprises
the main euro-area countries (France, Germany,
Greece, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal
and Spain) to which we have added the US and the
UK for comparison purposes. 
In Table 1, we compare the situation at the end of
2007 (before the outbreak of the global financial
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crisis) and with the most recent available data
(generally 2011 Q2 or Q3). Some of the countries
concerned report longer time series (going back
to the early or mid-nineties), and for these
countries we also present an historical overview
of the evolution of banks’ holding, as opposed to
non-resident holdings. It has to be stressed that
the absence of a single data provider implies that
the scope varies somewhat from country to
country, for example regarding the type of debt for
which the breakdown is available (general
government debt versus central government debt,
all maturities versus long-term debt, only
securities or also loans). We are aware that this
may to some extent limit comparability across
countries, especially in level terms but we have
checked our results against a similar (static)
analysis that the International Monetary Fund
conducted for Greece, Ireland, Portugal, the UK and
the US (IMF, 2011), and found them to be
consistent2. For European Central Bank holdings
2. The IMF used for those
countries the same
measure of debt that we
use (different across
countries) and focused
only on the latest available
data.
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within the framework of the Securities Market
Programme, no official breakdown is available, so
we rely on estimates by JP Morgan and Open
Europe. For a detailed explanation of data sources
and issues, see the Appendix.
FINDINGS
Back in 2007 two visibly different patterns could
be observed. First, euro-area countries appeared
to be characterised by large foreign holdings of
sovereign debt. The share of non-residents in total
holdings was very large for small countries
(consistent with portfolio theory), but even for the
bigger ones – France, Germany and Italy – it was
significantly above the corresponding figure for
the UK. The data does not provide for
disaggregation between other euro-area residents
and non-euro area residents, but Lane (2006)
showed that after the introduction of the single
currency cross-border debt portfolios became
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Domestic banks Central bank
European Central
Bank
Other public
institutions
Other residents
Non-residents
(excl. ECB)
TOTAL
2011 2007 2011 2007 2011 2007 2011 2007 2011 2007 2011 2007 2011 2007
Greece
35.5 23.9 4.8 3.2 42.0 .. 18.5 25.4 11.9 6.5 70.5 166.1 183.2 225.1
[19.4] [10.6] [2.62] [1.4] [22.9] .. [10.1] [11.3] [6.5] [2.9] [38.5] [73.8]
Ireland
15.1 0.8 n/a n/a 14.4 .. 0.8 0.1 2.2 1.2 57.1 28.8 89.7 30.9
[16.9] [2.6] [16.05] .. [0.9] [0.3] [2.4] [3.95] [63.75] [93.1]
Portugal
36.0 10.6 1.2 0.0 18.0 .. .. .. 21.7 17.3 83.5 87.7 160.5 115.6
[22.4] [9.1] [0.8] [0.0] [11.2] .. .. .. [13.5] [15.0] [52.1] [75.9]
Italy
267.9 159.9 76.5 60.3 103.4 .. .. .. 471.6 450.7 687.5 647.1 1606.9 1317.9
[16.7] [12.1] [4.8] [4.6] [6.4] .. .. .. [29.3] [34.2] [42.8] [49.1]
Spain
173.1 74.3 20.8 9.2 34.5 .. 65.3 26.5 128.4 73.3 219.3 166.7 641.4 349.9
[27] [21.2] [3.2] [2.6] [5.4] .. [10.2] [7.6] [20] [20.9] [34.2] [47.7]
Germany
404.2 456.9 4.4 4.4 .. .. 0.5 0.5 249.2 317.1  1105.0 761.5 1763.3 1540.4
[22.9] [29.7] [0.3] [0.3] .. .. [0.03] [0.03] [14.1] [20.6] [62.7] [49.4]
France
123.3 83.3 n/a n/a .. .. .. .. 255.5 205.0 502.2 352.4 881.0 640.7
[14.0] [13.0] .. .. .. .. [29.0] [32.0] [57.0] [55.0]
Netherlands
33.3 18.7 n/a n/a .. .. 3.4 0.9 66.4 44.7 207.1 144.6 310.1 209.0
[10.7] [8.9] .. .. [1.1] [0.4] [21.4] [21.4] [66.8] [69.2]
UK
114.9 -7.9 207.9 2.4 .. .. 1.5 0.8 423.5 337.3 323.5 160.2 1071.2 492.8
[10.7] [-1.6] [19.4] [0.5] .. .. [0.1] [0.2] [39.5] [68.5] [30.2] [32.5]
US
284.5 129.8 1617.1 754.6 .. .. 5087.7 4616.5 2853.0 1375.1 4500.8 2353.2 14343.1 9229.2
[2.0] [1.4] [11.3] [8.2] .. .. [35.5] [50.0] [19.9] [14.9] [31.4] [25.5]
Table 1: Breakdown by sector of holdings of marketable debt, 2007 and 2011 (billions of national currency and, in
parentheses, percent of total stock)
Source: Bruegel based on national authorities. Note: 2007 is the year-end data for all countries. 2011 is: October for Ireland; September for France; August for Italy; Q2
for Greece, Spain, Germany, The Netherlands, UK and US; 2010 end-year for Portugal. ECB mid-December 2011 country shares have been computed on the basis of esti-
mates by Open Europe and JP Morgan.
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3. For example in Spain (for
which data is available)
more than 63 percent of
non-residents’ holdings in
2005 were accounted for by
euro-area investors and
more than 80 percent by
European investors.
4. More recently, British
gilts also experienced
inflows, but our data for the
UK ends at 2011Q2, so this
effect is not evident as
November/December fig-
ures would be needed.
more ‘EMU-oriented’ across the euro area
(meaning that the proportion of cross-border
security holdings accounted for by Economic and
Monetary Union partners increased). Partial
evidence suggests that, except for German and
French debt, which are traded globally, foreign
holders of euro-area government debt are
overwhelmingly from euro-area partners3.
Second, Table 1 also indicates a clear differentia-
tion between continental European and Ireland,
the UK and US as far as the size of banks’ holdings
of sovereign debt is concerned. In 2007, conti-
nental banks held significant shares of domestic
public debt (more than one-fourth of the total in
Germany, Italy and Spain; about one-tenth in
France, Greece, the Netherlands and Portugal)
whereas in Ireland, the UK and the US, banks held
almost no domestic public debt. The vulnerability
of the euro area resulting from bank-sovereign
interdependence was therefore related to inher-
ited patterns of debt holdings.
The reason why banks in Europe hold so much
government debt is possibly twofold. First, it
relates to the features of the European financial
system, which remains largely bank-based. In
continental Europe, banks play a key intermediary
role that is to some extent mirrored by the size of
their assets. Government bonds are appealing
because they can be easily used as collateral
(both on the interbank markets in normal times
and for central banks’ emergency lending in
troubled times) and because the Basel regulatory
framework allows for the zero-risk weighting of
bonds issued by euro-area governments. These
considerations might explain why banks’ balance
sheets are loaded with government debt, but they
are not sufficient to clarify why banks may decide
to buy domestic government debt. Governments
may have exercised some (more or less implicit)
form of pressure on banks. The introduction of the
euro and the consequent convergence of interest
rates to the German levels removed the rationale
for such ‘financial repression’ and coincided with
a decline in banks’ holding of domestic
government debt (see Figure 1). But the
temptation to resort to some form of ‘financial
repression’ might return in crisis time.
In 2011, significant changes can be observed.
First, holdings of government debt by non-resi-
dents have diminished in proportion for all the
countries in trouble (Greece, Ireland, Portugal,
Spain and to a lesser extent Italy), while remaining
more or less stable for France and the Nether-
lands, and increasing for Germany. It is worth
recalling that our data only cover end-Q2 or Q3 at
the latest, so the situation might have changed
(especially for Italy, which has been under con-
siderable stress from September onwards). This
drop in the proportion of non-resident holdings is
evidence of portfolio rebalancing away from risk,
and the increase for Germany illustrates the safe-
haven role of the Bund (as well as the US T-Bond)4.
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Figure 1: Evolution of holdings by domestic
banks and non-residents (% of total holdings)
Source: Bruegel based on data from national authorities.
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5.The definition of
marketable debt in France
is also narrow; see the
Appendix.
Consequently, the share of domestic sovereign
debt held by domestic banks  increased signifi-
cantly between 2007 and 2011 in all countries
with bonds that have been shunned by non-resi-
dents (Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain),
remained roughly stable in France and the Nether-
lands, and decreased in Germany. If this can be
interpreted as evidence of a new wave of ‘finan-
cial repression’ is unclear, but at end-2011, sug-
gestions have been made that banks in the euro
area should increase their holdings of government
debt (see, for example, President Sarkozy’s public
suggestion that banks should use the ECB liquid-
ity to buy more sovereign bonds).
In Table 2 we report the same data as a proportion
of GDP. This is relevant as far as the aggregate
weight of public debt is concerned. It provides evi-
dence of the importance of bank holdings of
domestic debt in the euro area. In mid- to late-
2011 the domestic debt held by Italian banks
amounted to more than one-third of GDP in Italy,
one-fifth in Greece, Portugal and Spain, and one-
sixth in Germany. Even in Ireland it had increased
from a negligible level to one-tenth of GDP, thanks
to both the increase in the debt level and the
increase in the share held by banks. Only France
and the Netherlands exhibited low levels of hold-
ings, in part because their banks’ portfolios are
more diversified5.
When available, time series provide a longer-term
perspective and help understand what triggered
changes in holding patterns. Greece is a model
example in this respect (Figure 1). After the coun-
try joined the single currency in 2001, the share
of government debt held by domestic banks
started decreasing and reached its low point in
2008. Conversely, non-resident holdings exhibited
an opposite trend, peaking in 2008. The end of
2009, when Eurostat disclosed that Greece was
misreporting fiscal data, coincided with the begin-
ning of the reversal of the trend: non-resident hold-
ings started to decline markedly and national
banks’ holding increased again.
A reversal can also be observed in Spain, the start
of which coincided approximately with the
Lehman shock and the deterioration of the
domestic fiscal situation. The increased supply of
government bonds was increasingly absorbed by
domestic banks, whereas the share held by non-
residents decreased.
In contrast, data for Germany show that the good
reputation of the country is long-lived: non-resi-
dent holdings of government debt have been
increasing at least since the beginning of the
1990s. More interestingly, the share held by
domestic banks, which was stable until 1998,
started declining steadily after the introduction of
the euro. The financial crisis coincided with a timid
and short-lived reversal, before the crisis in the
European periphery resulted in an acceleration of
the increase of non-resident holdings.
Domestic banks Central bank
European Central
Bank
Other public
institutions
Other residents Non-residents TOTAL as %GDP
2011 2007 2011 2007 2011 2007 2011 2007 2011 2007 2011 2007 2011 2007
Greece 16.1 10.5 2.2 1.4 19.0 .. 8.4 11.2 5.4 2.9 31.9 73.2 82.9 99.1
Ireland 9.6 0.4 n/a n/a 9.2 .. 0.5 0.1 1.4 0.6 36.3 15.2 57.0 16.3
Portugal 20.8 6.2 0.7 0.0 10.4 .. .. .. 12.6 10.2 48.4 51.8 92.9 68.3
Italy 16.9 10.3 4.8 3.9 6.5 .. .. .. 29.7 29.1 43.3 41.8 101.1 85.2
Spain 15.9 7.0 1.9 0.9 3.2 .. 6.0 2.5 11.8 7.0 20.2 15.8 59.0 33.2
Germany 15.7 18.8 0.2 0.2 .. .. 0.0 0.0 9.7 13.1 43.0 31.4 68.7 63.4
France 6.2 4.4 n/a n/a .. .. .. .. 12.9 10.9 25.3 18.7 44.3 33.9
Netherlands 5.5 3.3 n/a n/a .. .. 0.6 0.2 10.9 7.8 34.1 25.3 51.1 36.5
UK 7.5 -0.6 13.6 0.2 .. .. 0.1 0.1 27.6 24.0 21.1 11.4 69.9 35.1
US 1.9 0.9 10.7 5.4 .. .. 33.8 32.9 18.9 9.8 29.9 16.8 95.2 65.8
Table 2: Breakdown by sector of holdings of marketable debt, 2007 and 2011 (% of GDP)
Source: Bruegel based on national authorities; IMF WEO September 2011. Note: 2007 is the year-end data for all countries. 2011 is: October for Ireland; September for
France; August for Italy; Q2 for Greece, Spain, Germany, The Netherlands, UK and US; 2010 end-year for Portugal.
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Figure 2 also shows that the initial phase of the
financial crisis has had a much stronger effect on
Ireland and the UK than more recent develop-
ments. In Ireland the share of non-residents was
about to plateau at a very high level at the time of
the Lehman shock and dropped immediately by
more than ten percentage points. Paradoxically,
the very crisis that highlighted the perverse inter-
dependence between banks and sovereigns and
its dire consequences for Irish public finances led
to a reinforcement of this interdependence. In the
UK also there was a shift of the same nature,
although of lesser magnitude. 
On the whole, our findings reveal common pat-
terns in the changes in the structure of govern-
ment bond portfolios both in the first nine years
and the last three years of EMU. They provide con-
sistent evidence for the recent reversal of ten-
dencies observed across the board during the
quiet 1999-2007 period, highlight the reaction of
non-resident and domestic banks to concerns
about state solvency, and illustrate the safe-
haven character of the German Bund.
CONCLUSIONS
The euro crisis has revealed how interdependence
between sovereigns and banks can weaken both
sides, and the whole monetary union as a conse-
quence. Data presented in this note provides evi-
dence of this hazardous relationship and shows
that it has – to some extent paradoxically –
strengthened during the crisis.
In 2007, despite a steady diversification trend
attributable to the introduction of the euro, most
continental euro-area countries were still charac-
terised by the large size of portfolios of their
domestic government bonds held by banks. These
were markedly larger than in the UK or the US,
where banks were not major buyers of govern-
ment paper. As a consequence, any concern about
sovereign solvency was bound to have major con-
sequences for banks.
Developments since 2007 have increased the
structural vulnerability of euro-area countries,
reinforcing the sovereign/banking crisis vicious
cycle. All countries for which concerns about state
solvency arose in recent years have seen a rever-
sal in the previously steady increase of the share
of government debt held by non residents. Ger-
many, by contrast, has seen an increase in the
share held by non residents. As a consequence,
domestic banks have become even more creditors
of ‘their’ sovereigns, at a time when sovereigns
are exposed to increasing pressure.
In the short term, these observations raise a ques-
tion about the effectiveness of ECB provision of
liquidity to banks as a means to alleviate the sov-
ereign crisis. At a point when government bonds
are considered risky assets, banks, whose expo-
sure to their domestic sovereign has increased
markedly, are faced with both a balance sheet and
a reputational risk in comparison to non-euro area
counterparts, and may prove reluctant to increase
this exposure further.
In the longer term, the question is if and how reg-
ulators and supervisors in the euro area should set
incentives to reduce the banks’ heavy exposure to
sovereigns, especially their own sovereign. This is
UK
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Figure 2: Holdings of domestic banks and non-residents (% total)
Source: Bruegel based on data from national authorities. For Ireland, data on banks also includes the central bank.
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‘Developments since 2007 have increased the structural vulnerability of euro-area countries. All
countries for which concerns about state solvency arose in recent years have seen a reversal in
the previously steady increase of the share of government debt held by non residents.’
an issue that deserves more attention than it is
receiving in European policy discussions on how
to strengthen the euro area.
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APPENDIX: DATA SOURCES AND ISSUES
Collecting the data for sectors’ holdings of govern-
ment debt is made difficult by the fact that the
data provider can be different in different coun-
tries (central banks, treasuries, national statisti-
cal offices). In addition, there are three main
issues:
1 For some countries, whole general government
debt (including loans etc) is given; in others
only government securities or even a narrower
sub-item (eg long-term securities) are given.
2 The frequency also varies: some countries col-
lect monthly data, others quarterly, and others
give the end-year figure.
3 Most importantly, different countries give dif-
ferent breakdowns of debt by holders, and pro-
vide different degrees of detail (ie the number
of sub-groups). This point is especially relevant
when looking at the holdings of national central
banks (NCBs), as this is generally included in
the broader category of Monetary Financial
Institutions (MFIs) or in the public sector (as
is the case for the US). Isolating the central
banks is therefore possible only if the NCBs’ bal-
ance sheets report information on the banks’
holding of domestic government securities
(not always the case).
The relevant problems/issues by country are as
follows (for further details, contact the authors):
GERMANY (Bundesbank): breakdown available
only for whole general government debt. This
measure is reported in national financial statis-
tics and is different from the Maastricht definition,
which includes some liabilities that are excluded
from the national statistics’ definition.
IRELAND (Central Bank of Ireland, CBI): the
disaggregation is available only for Irish Long-
term Government Bonds and it is impossible to
isolate the CBI from other MFIs as holdings of
government securities in the asset side of CBI’s
financial statements.
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ITALY (Central Bank of Italy): breakdown available
both for general government debt and for securi-
ties. We use data for securities because the alter-
native series includes a break because of
reclassification of Cassa Depositi e Prestiti.
SPAIN (Banco de Espana): breakdown available
for general government securities, from the finan-
cial accounts, or for general government debt
(Maastricht definition) from the Banco de Espana.
We use securities, results are not sensitive to the
measure used.
PORTUGAL (Banco de Portugal): breakdown avail-
able for general government debt, only annual
data.
THE NETHERLANDS (National Statistical Office):
data is available for total government debt or for
single instruments. We use total securities.
GREECE (Central Bank of Greece): the series for
the breakdown of short- and long-term securities
by holders can be reconstructed by looking at the
liability side of the central government’s balance
sheet and merging it with data from the asset side
of each sectors’ balance sheet, to fill gaps.
UK (Office for National Statistics, ONS): the break-
down can be reconstructed for long-term govern-
ment bonds issued by the UK central government,
looking at the UK’s sector financial accounts. To
isolate the Bank of England we relied on data on
the bank’s holding of sterling securities issued by
the public sector, provided by the Bank of England
itself. For some years, MFIs’ holdings of securities
are recorded with a negative sign. This is the result
of the accounting practice chosen, as holdings of
gilts are reported net of long and short positions.
US (Economic Report to the President and Treas-
ury Monthly Bulletin for the most recent months’
data, older data is identical across the two
sources): the breakdown is available for Treasury
Securities. To isolate the Federal Reserve, we use
data on the consolidated statement of conditions
of all Federal Reserve Banks, which identify Treas-
ury securities holdings on the asset side. Pension
funds are divided between private and govern-
ment funds. We decided to combine government
pension funds and private sector funds, but the
weight of this category is very limited in any case.
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